Iraq War reports conflicting

By Liam Satre-Meloy

Last Friday I slipped into the exhibition room of the de Saisset Museum to listen to Leon Panetta, former chief of staff for the Clinton administration and member of the Iraq Study Group, speak about the war in Iraq -- specifically about what America should do given our rather entangled position in the current state of affairs in that part of the world.

Now I have to be up-front and honest right away: I am not a student of political science, in any sense of the word, and I'm usually rather tentative to weigh-in on political affairs, as I don't feel like my rather unqualified opinion really means jack. But I couldn't hold myself back on this one. And I might be about to put my big fat foot in my mouth.

Something about Panetta's presentation of the findings of the ISG stirred in me a general sense of malaise. Something about a commission comprised of 10 big-shot, Christian, well-heeled, white (minus the one black "Junior Business Executive") bureaucrats "investigating" the political, social, cultural and religious quagmire of the Middle East, didn't seem to make much sense to me on a very basic level.

So I did a little research. I downloaded the Pdf version of the study's findings and went to work. And sure enough, I found what I was looking for -- I think. For all the time these people spent enlightening themselves about America's involvement in Iraq, it seems as though the ISG neglected to study the war at its most essential level: that of the front lines. Or even the middle lines. The report's appendix lists a slew of Iraqi men and women interviewees, however, none of them rank below a lieutenant colonel.

Slate's Phillip Carter writes, "It's at the (infantrymen) level where the war will be won or lost. It speaks volumes that the panel did not take the time to hear any of these grunt-level voices while in Iraq or back in the United States." And I think he's exactly right. I'm concerned about a serious disconnect between what's actually going on in Iraq (especially outside the "Green Zone") and what commissions such as the ISG are reporting, and I'm not entirely sure where to place the blame.

Regardless, I think this disconnect reflects the essence of America's position in the Middle East for the last 10 or so years: our solutions to their problems seldom work, and even if they do, they are rarely sustainable. Too frequently, U.S. officials trumpet, "We've found the answer to the Iraqi/Syranian/Iranian problem!" And then a year later it blows up in their faces as a glorified nostrum.

But hey, regardless of whether we speak a lick of Arabic or know even two of the five pillars of Islam, we've got the technology, the pocketbook and the man-power to make it "work out just fine!" Right?