Understanding freedom in Islam is important

By Ahmed Eissa

I am writing this article partially in response to Nick Obradovich's article, "An Islamic choice: peace or violence" in the Oct. 26 issue, and partially in response to the increasing inquiry about and questioning of the status of freedom of speech in Islam.

When addressing freedom of speech, it's important to keep in mind that it is not a value in and of itself. Rather, it is a manifestation of another over-arching, deeper value: freedom. And it is the way we view and define freedom that defines and confines freedom of speech. It is precisely here that the views of the West and those of Islam diverge.

For the West, freedom is the ability to exercise one's will in whatever way one desires. The individual's choice then becomes of first priority. In Islam, freedom lies within the complete submission to the Divine and "freeing" oneself from all other forces. The rationales behind that and the implications of it are numerous, but what concerns me here is that the divine becomes of ultimate priority. For a Muslim, offending the Divine or anything directly related to it, like the Prophets or the Quran, becomes more critical than personal offenses.

There is also another very important side to the West's perception of freedom -- it's the view that every individual should be free from the harm of others. This balance between the ability to freely act and acting within the constraints of not harming others is crucial to the prosperity of the over-arching value of freedom. So, if we put both views in perspective, we might be able to see how an infringement on the Islamic freedom could lead to an infringement on freedom from a Western perspective.

But then why would our secular Western societies have to adhere to the Islamic perspective on freedom when they have a different, possibly conflicting, perspective on it? The answer is that they don't. This is a matter of tolerance, a respect of the other and an appreciation of diversity. Obviously, it would make no sense to speak of tolerance if there were no differences, because, by definition, if there were no differences there would not be anything to tolerate.

But the essence of tolerance is not to merely agree with the others' beliefs and perspectives, but to respect them and acknowledge the others' right to hold them. These are a matter of personal choice and a function of fine ethical conduct. Nonetheless, I believe that by being in a Jesuit school we have a greater responsibility in adhering to such high standards.

And, by all means, it should not be understood from my words that there is no room for criticism in Islam, only that there is a difference between respectful, constructive criticism and disrespectful criticism. For example, in his article, Obradovich criticized one of the most fundamental facets of Islam: The infallibility of the Quran and the Prophet. But, his criticism was done in a constructive and respectful manner. Thus, his criticism is well-accepted.

But it doesn't seem to me that the solution to the violent reactions to such expressions of opinion lies in questioning the infallibility of the Quran and the Prophet.

The infallibility of the Quran and the Prophet is one of the most fundamental facets upon which the entire faith is built (and this infallibility is not confined to Muhammad but to all the Prophets that preceded him as well). And this violence is more a result of religious ignorance than that of Islamic commands.

It is astounding that a Turkish lawmaker should be cited for his response to the pope's statements, while the highest Muslim scholars' response is ignored. Obradovich highlighted the murder of the nun in Somalia, but the response of the Muslim authorities in Mogadishu passed without mention.

It is also astonishing that the Prophet's execution orders against those who mocked him are highlighted, while the several accounts of his forgiveness are ignored. These execution orders are, in fact, an argument against the violent reactions of some Muslims, and not for it.

If these orders made it a "requirement by faith" to kill everyone who mocks the Prophet, thousands of people, including the people of Mecca, who physically and verbally harmed the Prophet, would have been executed instead of forgiven by the Prophet. And if we examine the proportion of those who were executed to those forgiven, it becomes evident that the execution orders were an exception rather than the rule.

That leads us to a very important point in understanding Islam -- not all actions of the Prophet are to be generalized, and this does not have to question the Prophet's infallibility. If the Prophet, for example, used to travel on camels, why, then, does it not follow that all Muslims should be "required by faith" to travel on camels?

What should and what shouldn't be generalized within the Prophet's acts are the subject of two immense Islamic sciences, "fiqh" and "usul al-fiqh." And just like any science, those who can best approach it are those who are the best versed in it and the most knowledgeable: the scholars.

We must keep in mind that just because some Muslims commit a certain act, it doesn't mean that act should be deemed typical of Islam. As an analogy to follow the same reasoning: If all crows are birds and all crows are black, then all birds are black. Though this could be a deductive argument, it certainly is not a valid one.

Ahmed Eissa is a senior management and psychology double major. He is President of the Muslim Student Association.